Addressing many environmental problems requires international cooperation. However, rules under the World Trade Organization (WTO) may deter participation in multilateral environmental agreements. Using a partial identification approach, we obtain strictly negative bounds for non-OECD countries in the WTO era.
Introduction
Little is known about the interaction between international trade agreements and domestic environmental policy.
Here, we ask whether membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its predecessor, the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), has a causal effect on participation in multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs).
1 Understanding participation in MEAs is crucial as addressing many environmental problems requires international cooperation (Kellenberg and Levinson 2014).
Since World War II, more than 150 countries have joined the GATT/WTO and numerous MEAs have been formed. Over 350 international environmental agreements are currently in force; most consist of at least five countries. These time trends do not suggest a 'chilling' effect of GATT/WTO membership on MEA participation.
Nonetheless, there are reasons to be concerned. First, economic theory emphasizes the need for full participation in
MEAs to be successful, and this often requires punishments (or rewards) imposed through trade policies. Moreover, trade leakage due to nonparticipants may undermine MEA effectiveness (Barrett 2005). Second, some MEAs must impede trade by definition to achieve their objectives.
2 Consequently, countries may reject such MEAs due to fear of violating WTO rules propagating nondiscriminatory trade (Rauscher 2005) . Alternatively, MEAs designed to be compatible with GATT/WTO rules may be less appealing to countries (Eckersley 2004).
Reasons also exist to reject the claim of a 'chilling' effect. First, Article XX of the GATT allows for measures to protect human, animal, or plant health (or life) as long as they do not discriminate in an arbitrary or unjust manner, are not a form of disguised protection, and are the least trade restrictive among alternatives. Second, if
GATT/WTO membership promotes trade and economic growth, then the income effect may induce greater demand for environmental protection. Third, GATT/WTO members may participate in MEAs to avail non-tariff barriers (such as labeling requirements).
Thus, whether the WTO has a causal effect on participation in MEAs is an empirical question. However, estimation is plagued by two econometric challenges: self-selection into the GATT/WTO and misclassification of WTO membership status. While the former is straightforward, the latter is not. Interestingly, the literature on GATT/WTO membership has highlighted concerns over de jure versus de facto accession into the WTO (Tomz et al. 2007 for OECD and non-OECD countries in the pre-WTO era. Third, our preferred bounds that account for non-random selection into the GATT/WTO are strictly negative for non-OECD countries in the WTO period (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) in the absence of misclassification (although the confidence intervals do contain zero). 4 This suggests that WTO membership may have a chilling effect on MEA participation by less developed countries given the demands placed on them for accession to the WTO (Subramanian and Wei 2007) . The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 presents the empirical methodology. Section 3 discusses the data. Section 4 discusses the results. Section 5 concludes.
Methodology
Our objective is to bound the ATE of GATT/WTO membership status on MEA participation, defined as
where P [·] denotes the probability of the argument being true, M is a binary indicator defined such that one (zero) denotes MEA participation (non-participation), and W T O * is a binary indicator defined such that one (zero) corresponds to true WTO membership (non-membership). The probabilities are conditioned on observed covariates, X. We condition on OECD status and time period (pre-or post-WTO formation).
and
Estimation of (1) is complicated due to (i) the missing counterfactual problem (i. In terms of selection, we consider three assumptions:
(S1) Exogenous Selection (ES):
(S3) Monotone Instrumental Variable (MIV):
where ν is the MIV and u 1 < u < u 2 .
MTS assumes positive selection into treatment as the potential outcomes are at least as great in expectation in the treatment group. This is reasonable as countries often participate in MEAs and the WTO to signal credibility or a pro-growth stance. MIV assumes that potential outcomes are (weakly) monotonically increasing in v. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita is used as the monotone instrument, v. However, given the literature on the environmental Kuznets curve (EKC), which suggests that economic growth is associated with lower (higher) environmental quality at low (high) income levels, we divide the sample into OECD and non-OECD countries (e.g., List et al. 2003) . In the OECD sample, we define v as GDP per capita; we assume expected MEA participation is (weakly) increasing in income. For the non-OECD sample, we define v as minus GDP per capita; we assume expected MEA participation is (weakly) decreasing in income. We assess sensitivity to this choice.
In terms of misclassification, we consider two assumptions:
(M1) Upper Bound Error Rate:
Q is the maximum allowable rate of misclassification. NFP is reasonable as we define GATT/WTO membership based on de jure membership; thus, misclassification only arises if some non-members act as members. 
Data
Summary statistics and sources are provided in Table A1 
Results
In the interest of brevity, we only display the results for the non-OECD sample. Table 1 reports the results for the pre-WTO period . Table 2 reports the results for the post-WTO period (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) . 6 Nonetheless, we briefly describe the results obtained for the OECD sample as well.
7
We obtain several salient findings. First, for both OECD and non-OECD countries, GATT/WTO membership is positively associated with MEA participation under the assumptions of exogenous selection and no misclassification. For non-OECD countries, this continues to hold in most cases even if 5% of the control group are de facto GATT/WTO members. Second, bounds that allow for non-random selection into the GATT/WTO do not exclude zero -even with the imposition of MTS or MTS-MIV and the assumption of no misclassification -for OECD and non-OECD countries in the pre-WTO era. Allowing for misclassification only further widens the bounds. Third, the point estimates of the bounds are strictly negative for non-OECD countries in the WTO period (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) in the absence of misclassification. 8 Allowing for misclassification up to 5%, the point estimates of the bounds continue to exclude zero in Panel II of Table 2 . While the confidence intervals include zero, this suggests that WTO membership has a chilling effect on MEA participation by less developed countries. Finally, the results are sensitive to the choice of MIV. If expected MEA participation is assumed to be (weakly) monotonically increasing in real GDP per capita for non-OECD countries, the bounds always include zero.
9
The benefit of the partial identification approach is that it enables one to assess precisely what is learned under alternative, transparent sets of assumptions. That said, we find the results in Table 2 compelling given the negative association between income and environmental quality in lesser developed countries found in the EKC literature.
Under this assumption, the strictly negative point estimates of the ATE are consistent with Subramanian and Wei "A non-member country that aspires to become a member has to make concessions and obtain approval from every existing member country. As a result, it is easier to demand that these new entrants reduce trade barriers to a 8 While the exclusion of zero from the bounds occurs only under the assumption of no misclassification in Panel I, this is more plausible in the WTO period (Tomz et al. 2007) .
9 See Table A3 in the Appendix.
greater extent than to do the same to the existing members... [P]ost-Uruguay Round accessions have indeed been qualitatively different in the sense of extracting more trade liberalizing concessions from prospective entrants."
Conclusion
As discussed in Horn and Mavroidis (2014, p. 147), while WTO members "are legally bound to respect negotiated reductions of barriers to trade," many members are also party to MEAs "that often impose rights or obligations for members to restrict trade." Thus, the relationship between the WTO and MEAs "has created significant controversy, since neither ... clarify the relationship between these sometimes, at least seemingly, contradictory undertakings." However, to our knowledge, the causal effect of WTO membership on MEA participation has not been analyzed. Using a partial identification approach, we obtain strictly negative bounds for non-OECD countries in the WTO period (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) . This is consistent with the stringent demands of trade liberalization placed on new WTO members. It also implies that global integration may do little to facilitate cooperation on international environmental issues. 
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